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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SALT LAKE CITY CORP., 
: Case No. 20040280-CA 
APPELLANT, 
: Incarcerated 
v. 
SALT LAKE CITY CIVIL SERVICE 
COMMISSION, : 
RESPONDENT. : 
JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1012.5 provides this Court's jurisdiction over the final 
order of the civil service commission. 
ISSUE. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION 
Did the civil service commission abuse its discretion in reversing the police chiefs 
termination of Lieutenant Begay? 
The commission's ruling is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g.. Salt 
Lake City Corp v. Salt Lake Civil Service Com'n., 908 P.2d 871 (Utah App. 1995). 
Ms. Begay's arguments were raised before the commission in evidentiary hearings, 
arguments and briefing (R. 153, 154,67-71, 132-152). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
The pertinent constitutional provisions and statutes are in the addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION 
The chief of police terminated Lieutenant Begay from her employment with the 
Salt Lake City Police Department (e.g. R. 5-10). 
She appealed the termination to the civil service commission (R. 4). 
The commission held a full evidentiary hearing and then issued a memorandum 
concluding that Begay should be reinstated (R. 22-27). The commission entered findings 
of fact and conclusions of law in support of her reinstatement (R. 28-32). 
The city filed a motion for relief from the findings of fact and conclusions of law 
(R. 33-56). Begay filed a reply (R. 67-71), and the city filed a response (R. 72-82). Both 
parties filed final briefs (R. 89-131; 132-135). 
After hearing oral arguments, the commission denied the motion for relief from the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law (R. 149, R. 154). 
The city appealed (R. 151). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Lieutenant Begay served as a Salt Lake City Police Officer for sixteen and a half 
years, and served in the military police before that - police work was her life (R. 153 at 
221-22). She received numerous commendations for her excellent service (R. 153 at 10-
13, 221-23; Deposition Exhibit A, pages 2-28). Her job performance evaluations from 
1986 through 2001 were excellent (Deposition Exhibit A, pages 30-46). 
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The chief of police recognized that she was an outstanding police officer with no 
history of discipline, who had received excellent evaluations and many commendations, 
and who had earned her Master of Social Work degree while serving as a police officer 
(R. 153 at 90-91). 
While she was in school working on her Master's, she maintained a grade point 
average close to 4.0, and taught courses in conferences on alcohol and drug dependency, 
on the role of peyote and Native American Church involvement in healing alcoholism (R. 
153 at 118). As part of her social work education, Begay performed psychiatric and 
trauma evaluations at the University of Utah Emergency Department (R. 153 at 120). She 
was the head of the CIT, or Crimes Intervention Team, designed to deal with mentally ill 
and violent offenders, and developed a statewide program on how to handle mentally ill 
people (R. 153 at 223). She was also a highly effective narcotics officer (R. 153 at 226). 
Begay is an enrolled member of the Cherokee Chippewa Tribe, and a member of 
the Native American Church (R. 153 at 223). Peyote is a holy sacrament which is used in 
Native American Church ceremonies, and its religious use by Native Americans is 
protected by federal law, see 42 U.S.C. § 1996a (R. 153 at 226). Begay's use of peyote 
never interfered with her work, and she discussed it with her fellow officers and 
supervisors (R. 153 at 226-228). 
Numerous fellow officers and others who had worked with her in the mental health 
field attested to her integrity and high ethical standards, to her exemplary commitment to 
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her work, and to the fact that her religious involvement with peyote was not detrimental 
to her or her professional performance in any way (R. 153 at 121-122, 185-87, 188-90, 
200,201-03). 
In July of 2002, the police department received an anonymous letter complaining 
that Begay's use of peyote in the Native American Church was illegal because Begay is 
not Native American, but is only married to a Native American (R. 153 at 20, Deposition 
Exhibit A, page 49). 
Actually, Begay is not only married to a Native American, but also is one herself 
(E.g. Deposition Exhibit A, page 99). 
The department did not inform Begay of the anonymous letter, but instead waited 
for some six months while the city attorney consulted with the department and considered 
the legality of her using peyote (R. 153 at 92, 103). 
When Begay was informed of the allegation some six months after the department 
received it, she was fully cooperative in the internal affairs investigation, and admitted to 
using peyote and to having peyote in her home as part of her religious practice in the 
Native American Church, of which she is a member (Deposition Exhibit A, pages 98 and 
100, 107, 116, 120, R. 153 at 231-232). 
The police went to Begay's home and confiscated a bottle of dried peyote powder 
and 87 live peyote buttons (R. 117-131; R. 153 at 232). 
Begay had made the powder by grinding the parts of the plants that had rotted or 
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died, as the religion forbids wasting any of the peyote plant (R. 153 at 235). She and her 
husband had used part of the powder in religious ceremonies with her parents when they 
were ill (R. 153 at 242). 
The Begays had received the 87 buttons from other NAC members, who had 
lawfully received them from a custodian (R. 153 at 234). 
Lieutenant Begay testified that she kept the live peyote in soil to preserve it for a 
future ceremony, as the fresh plants will rot or die if they are not in soil, and as fresh 
plants are at times used in religious ceremonies (Deposition Exhibit A, page 202; R. 153 
at234-36).1 
She believed that under the Indian Religious Freedom Act, their possession and 
Professor of social work of American Indian studies, E. Daniel Edwards, testified 
that Native American Church members commonly take live plants home and keep them in 
pots or in the ground to preserve them for later church ceremonies (R. 153 at 107, 112). 
Kristi Renae Begay, Terry Begay's sister-in-law, testified that NAC members often 
store fresh peyote buttons, both with and without roots, in the dirt to preserve them, as 
refrigerators are used to store food, because otherwise, they will dry up and bruise (R. 153 
at 135, 140). She explained that custodians often order large numbers of buttons and 
entrust them to church members to keep them green (R. 153 at 137). She confirmed that 
members save every part of the peyote plant and do not waste it (R. 153 at 141). 
Franklin Pine, a peyote ceremony leader, testified about how people sometimes 
take entire plants from the distributors and keep them in sandy soil and occasionally water 
them until they are needed for healing ceremonies (R. 153 at 157, 164). He explained that 
people will eat the live plants, roots and all (R. 153 at 165-66). It is hard to get the green 
medicine, and when people do, they preserve it in the dirt (R. 153 at 169, 173). 
Timothy Dish Sr., confirmed that people keep individual plants in the ground as a 
way to save it until they need it (R. 153 at 181). 
Johnny Yellowman testified that people often replant peyote in the dirt and keep it 
in their homes to use it later and keep it fresh (R. 153 at 194-96). 
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use of peyote for religious purposes were lawful (R. 153 at 236-38). As she understood 
the lawful process, the DEA has distributors who harvest peyote and send it to custodians, 
who deliver it to the sponsors, or hosts of the ceremonies, at which point it is lawfully in 
the hands of the church and its members (T. 23 8-241).2 In keeping the 87 peyote buttons 
in the soil and caring for the plants, she was preserving lawfully obtained peyote (T. 239). 
She would have been willing to refrain from taking the peyote sacrament, had her 
career so required, but she was never given the opportunity to do so before the chief 
terminated her employment (R. 153 at 246). 
The chief of police terminated Begay for planting and growing peyote, as he 
considered this a felony (R. 153 at 89, 105). 
He acknowledged that officers may violate the law and receive lesser sanctions, 
such as suspensions, and that lesser sanctions are always available (R. 153 at 81, 89). He 
did not consider lesser sanctions in this case, however, because the crime involved was a 
felony (R. 153 at 89). 
In the appeal from the chiefs termination of Begay, the commission recognized 
Begay's outstanding sixteen-and-a-half year career as a police woman, Begay's status as 
2
 Jerry Ellis, DEA peyote expert, described the law governing peyote, 
confirming that federally licensed peyote distributors harvest naturally growing peyote 
and distribute it to custodians in the Native American Church (R. 153 at 40-46). Once the 
peyote reaches the custodians, the government does not regulate it (R. 153 at 61). 
Walter E. Echohawk of the Native American Rights Fund, who signed the c into 
law, told Begay and their activities were protected use and possession of the peyote 
medicine (R. 153 at 243, 252). 
6 
an American Indian, Begay's commitment to the Native American Church, and Begay5s 
federally protected right to partake of peyote as part of her religious practice (R. 22-23, 
29). 
The commission recognized that the evidence was unclear regarding Begay's 
intent in putting the peyote buttons she had received in soil, but specifically found after 
considering the conflicting evidence that Begay's primary purpose in putting the buttons 
in soil was to preserve them, in accordance with standard NAC practices (R. 23-24, 30). 
The commission reviewed the applicable federal law and concluded that Begay's 
use of peyote, and preserving it in soil in her home, were strictly connected with her 
participation in the religious ceremonies of the Native American Church, and constituted 
federally protected use, possession and transportation of peyote (R. 25). 
The commission found that the police department had not carried its burden under 
its rules to prove that Begay had violated the law, and concluded that her termination was 
both unjustified and disproportionate (R. 26, 31). The commission noted that it was not 
clear that Begay had violated the law, and recognized that perhaps she should have 
clarified the legality of her activities (R. 26, 31). The commission concluded that perhaps 
the department could have counseled or warned Begay, but that her termination was not 
justified (R. 26-27, 31). The commission ordered her reinstated as an employee in good 
standing in the police department (R. 27, 31). 
After the city challenged this ruling, the commission maintained that after 
7 
reviewing the internal affairs investigation, it was convinced that the chief of police 
should not have terminated Begay, because she had not manufactured the 87 buttons the 
police had confiscated from her home, but had merely been preserving the same 87 
buttons she had received from the couple from Arizona (R. 154 at 11-12). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The American Indian Religious Freedom Act protects Native Americans' use 
possession and transportation of peyote for religious purposes, and does not exclude live 
peyote from religious protection or require that the peyote involved must be dead. 
Begay's possession, use and transportation of the live and dead peyote is protected by this 
federal law. 
While the CFR does require those who manufacture or distribute peyote for the 
Native American Church to register, Begay was not acting as a manufacturer or 
distributor for the church, but was possessing the live peyote in the dirt in order to 
preserve it in live form, and was grinding the dead peyote into powder in order to 
preserve it, and sharing the peyote in religious ceremonies in the course of her religious 
use, possession and transportation of peyote. 
The commission carefully considered the testimony of the witnesses who testified 
before the commission, the internal affairs investigation, and all evidence presented and 
determined that Begay's intent in keeping the 87 peyote buttons in soil was to preserve 
the peyote in live form. 
8 
The commission properly concluded that the police department failed to carry its 
burden of proving that Begay had violated the law,3 and that Begay's termination was 
disproportionate to any impropriety that may have occurred. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. 
THE COMMISSION CORRECTLY FOUND 
THAT BEGAY WAS NOT MANUFACTURING PEYOTE. 
The American Indian Religious Freedom Act protects Native Americans' use 
possession and transportation of peyote for religious purposes, and does not exclude live 
peyote from religious protection or require that the peyote involved must be dead. The act 
does not define or otherwise limit the terms use, possess or transport. See id. Begay's 
use, possession and transportation of the live and dead peyote is protected by this federal 
law. See42U.S.C. 1996a. 
While the CFR does require those who manufacture or distribute peyote for the 
Native American Church to register, 21 CFR 1307.31, Begay was not acting as a 
manufacturer or distributor for the church, but was possessing the live peyote in the dirt in 
order to preserve it in live form. Jerry Ellis, DEA peyote expert, described federally 
licensed peyote distributors, who can harvest and dry naturally growing peyote in Texas, 
and distribute it to custodians in the Native American Church (R. 153 at 40-46). He 
3Rule 6-4-6(4) of the Salt Lake Civil Service Commission's rules requires the 
department to carry the burden of proof in disciplinary appeals. See 
http://slcilp.slcgov.com/Civi^ 
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testified that once the peyote reaches the custodians, the government does not regulate it 
amongst church members (R. 153 at 61). Begay also recognized that the DEA has 
distributors who harvest peyote and send it to custodians, who deliver it to the sponsor, or 
host of the ceremonies (R. 153 at 238-241). At that point, it is lawfully in the hands of 
the church and its members (R. 153 at 239). In keeping in the dirt the 87 peyote buttons 
she had received from the church members who had received them from a legal 
custodian, Begay was preserving lawfully obtained peyote (R. 153 at 239). 
The commission carefully considered the testimony of the witnesses who testified 
before the commission, the internal affairs investigation, and all evidence presented and 
determined that Begay's intent in keeping the 87 peyote buttons in soil was to preserve 
the peyote in live form (R. 23-26,30-31; R. 154 at 11-12). 
A. PURPORTED INADEQUACY OF COMMISSION FINDINGS 
The city assails the commission for failing to make findings regarding whether 
Begay violated federal law when she ground dead peyote plant into powder, or when she 
shared it with others during religious ceremonies. City's brief at 11-12, 15-22. 
Begay has never contested grinding dried peyote into powder to preserve it, or 
sharing the powder. Because the evidence is clear and uncontroverted on this point, the 
absence of findings is of no consequence. See, e.g., Lucas v. Murray City Civil Service 
Com'n., 949 P.2d 746, 755 (Utah App. 1997) (absence of findings is inconsequential 
when evidence is clear, uncontroverted, and capable of only one conclusion). 
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The commission's focusing on whether Begay was manufacturing peyote, as 
opposed to whether she processed or distributed it, is explained by the fact that Chief 
Dinse did not refer to the latter two factors when he explained why he fired Begay. He 
stated, "The duty - yeah, the issue is her obligation as a police officer in planting and 
growing peyote." (R. 153 at 105). 
Given that the commission was supposed to assess whether the facts supported the 
department head's decision, see Ogden City Corp. v. Harmon, 2005 UT App 274, f^ 10, 
2005 WL 1404604, the commission properly addressed the basis for Chief Dinse's 
terminating Begay - Begay's alleged planting and growing of the peyote (R. 153 at 105). 
Assuming arguendo that the Commission was obligated to make findings, the 
record reflects that Begay did not violate the law in grinding the dead peyote into powder 
or in sharing it with other church members, facts she has not disputed. As DEA Agent 
Ellis explained, once peyote goes from federally regulated harvesters and distributors to 
church members, the government no longer regulates it (R. 153 at 61). The evidence 
before the commission demonstrates that in the course of their religious use of peyote, 
Native American Church members routinely grind dried peyote into powder, routinely 
add water to this powder and thereby make it into tea, routinely store live plants in dirt at 
home to use in later ceremonies, and routinely share it with one another prior to and 
throughout the ceremonies (e.g. R. 153 at 110-113, Deposition Exhibit A at 142, 152). 
What might be viewed as processing or distributing a controlled substance in another 
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context is essential to, inherent in, and protected as religious use, possession and 
transportation of peyote by the Indian Religious Freedom Act, 42 U.S.C. 1996a.4 
4Reviewing the expressed legislative intent and most critical parts of the act takes a 
minute, but is worthwhile. 42 U.S.C. 1996(a) and (b)(1) and (2) state: 
The Congress finds and declares that-
(1) for many Indian people, the traditional ceremonial use of the peyote cactus as a 
religious sacrament has for centuries been integral to a way of life, and significant 
in perpetuating Indian tribes and cultures; 
(2) since 1965, this ceremonial use of peyote by Indians has been protected by 
Federal regulation; 
(3) while at least 28 States have enacted laws which are similar to, or are in 
conformance with, the Federal regulation which protects the ceremonial use of 
peyote by Indian religious practitioners, 22 States have not done so, and this lack 
of uniformity has created hardship for Indian people who participate in such 
religious ceremonies; 
(4) the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Employment Division v. 
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), held that the First Amendment does not protect Indian 
practitioners who use peyote in Indian religious ceremonies, and also raised 
uncertainty whether this religious practice would be protected under the 
compelling State interest standard; and 
(5) the lack of adequate and clear legal protection for the religious use of peyote by 
Indians may serve to stigmatize and marginalize Indian tribes and cultures, and 
increase the risk that they will be exposed to discriminatory treatment. 
(b) Use, possession, or transportation of peyote 
(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the use, possession, or 
transportation of peyote by an Indian for bona fide traditional ceremonial purposes 
in connection with the practice of a traditional Indian religion is lawful, and shall 
not be prohibited by the United States or any State. No Indian shall be penalized or 
discriminated against on the basis of such use, possession or transportation, 
including, but not limited to, denial of otherwise applicable benefits under public 
assistance programs. 
(2) This section does not prohibit such reasonable regulation and registration by 
the Drug Enforcement Administration of those persons who cultivate, harvest, or 
distribute peyote as may be consistent with the purposes of this section and section 
1996 of this title. 
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B. COMMISSION'S RECOGNITION OF CONFUSING LAW 
The city complains that the commission found that the law regarding the 
lawfulness of Begay's conduct is confusing. City's brief at 22-27. 
The commission correctly recognized that a lesser punishment than termination, 
such as a warning or counseling, was in order, particularly given the confusing nature of 
the law (R. 26-27, 31). 
The record reflects that the police department did not take action on the 
anonymous letter complaining of Begay's use of peyote for six months because it was 
consulting with the city attorney's office for six months regarding the lawfulness of 
Begay's use of peyote (R. 153 at 92, 103). 
Chief Llewellyn's letter to Begay reflects uncertainty regarding whether she is 
entitled to any protection under the federal law, given her tribal status (Deposition Exhibit 
A, page 196), and after describing the facts he felt established her commission of a 
felony, his letter reflects that she "may be in violation o f the department policy requiring 
her to obey the law (Deposition Exhibit A, page 195)(emphasis added). 
While the city is correct that the record does not disclose why the commission's 
lawyer was confused by the law, by reviewing 18 U.S.C. 1996a, this Court can readily 
confirm that the law is somewhat vague and confusing. 
The confusion in the law stems from the fact that the American Indian Religious 
Freedom Act does not define the terms use, transport, possess, distribute or manufacture, 
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the first three of which terms describe protected conduct, and the last two of which terms 
describe conduct which may be regulated by registration and other requirements. See id. 
subsection (b)(1) and (2). 
The absence of definitions is problematic, because what might ordinarily be 
considered acts of distribution and manufacturing are inherent parts of religious use and 
possession of peyote. Native American Church members routinely grind dried peyote 
into powder, routinely add water to this powder and thereby make it into tea, routinely 
store live plants in dirt at home to use in later ceremonies, and routinely share it with one 
another prior to and throughout the ceremonies (e.g. R. 153 at 110-113, Deposition 
Exhibit A at 142, 152). 
The city perfunctorily asserts that Begay's conduct "was not the use of peyote in a 
bone fide religious ceremony," but fails to recognize that the AIRFA grants far broader 
protection. It states in subsection (b): 
(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the use, possession, or 
transportation of peyote by an Indian for bona fide traditional ceremonial 
purposes in connection with the practice of a traditional Indian religion is 
lawful, and shall not be prohibited by the United States or any State. No 
Indian shall be penalized or discriminated against on the basis of such use, 
possession or transportation, including, but not limited to, denial of 
otherwise applicable benefits under public assistance programs. 
Before the commission, the city presented no case law or other legal arguments in 
support of its conclusion that Begay's conduct amounts to felonious manufacturing, or 
producing or distribution of a controlled substance, but relied exclusively on the 
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testimony of DEA expert Jerry Ellis. The city on appeal likewise relies on Ellis' 
testimony to establish the law. City's brief at 19-20, 25. Mr. Ellis, however, was a law 
enforcement investigator and officer (R. 153 at 41-42), who dealt primarily with 
registered peyote distributors and custodians, who were subject to criminal, civil or 
administrative penalties and registration revocations (R. 153 at 54-55). He had never had 
any experience in a prosecution against someone in Begay's position (R. 153 at 57-58). 
While the city asserts that Begay's conduct amounts to manufacturing and 
producing a controlled substance under the definitions of those terms set forth in 21 
U.S.C. 802, e.g. city's brief at 42, those definitions specifically apply only to the control 
and enforcement subchapter of title 21, see 21 U.S.C. § 802 ("As used in this subchapter 
..."), and have no application to Title 42, the location of the AIRFA. 
Given that Native American Church members routinely grind dried peyote into 
powder, routinely add water to this powder and thereby make it into tea, routinely store 
live plants in dirt at home to use in later ceremonies, and routinely share it with one 
another prior to and throughout the ceremonies (e.g. R. 153 at 110-113, Deposition 
Exhibit A at 142, 152), it is apparent that traditional religious use and possession of 
peyote involves conduct which might otherwise amount to manufacturing or cultivation 
or distribution of a controlled substance. 
While it appears that the only people who are regulated in manufacturing and 
distributing peyote are those who harvest it in Texas and distribute it to custodians for 
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unregulated distribution and use among church members (R. 40-46, 61, testimony of DEA 
expert), and that conduct such as Begay's is legally protected (R. 153 at 243, 252, opinion 
of Walter E. Echohawk of the Native American Rights Fund, who signed the AIRFA into 
law), the police chief and the city are apparently honestly confused into believing that 
Begay's conduct amounted to felony distribution or manufacturing of a controlled 
substance (Deposition Exhibit A, page 195, R. 153 at 89, 105). 
The city and the police chiefs ultimate decision take the position that when Begay 
purportedly processed or manufactured the peyote without the registration required by 21 
CFR 1307.31, or distributed the peyote, this stripped her religious use and possession and 
transportation of peyote of the religious protection provided by 42 USC 1996a (e.g. R. 
153 at 89, 105, city's brief at 24). Federal law, however, does not indicate that a Native 
American who is in violation of the registration requirements is thereby stripped of all 
protection of the AIRFA, or guilty of a felony, or that her use and possession of peyote 
which might arguably otherwise constitute cultivation and distribution, are unprotected or 
felonious. Nor is there any case law on point. From the testimony of Mr. Ellis, it appears 
that if Begay's conduct amounts to distribution of peyote without registration, this could 
result in any number of federal consequences, ranging from criminal, civil or 
administrative penalties (R. 153 at 54-55). 
The commission was correct in recognizing that the city had failed to carry its 
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burden of proving that Begay had violated the law,5 and correctly recognized that the 
confusion in the law should ameliorate the consequences of any purported violations. 
See Qgden City Corp. v. Harmon. 2005 UT App 274, % 18, 2005 WL 1404604 ("an 
exemplary service record and tenuous evidence of misconduct may tip the balance against 
termination."). 
C. CHALLENGE TO FINDINGS REGARDING GROWING VERSUS PRESERVING 
PEYOTE 
The city marshals the evidence supporting the commission's finding that Begay 
was not manufacturing peyote when she preserved it in live form in dirt, and contends 
that the commission abused its discretion in failing to recognize that Begay was 
manufacturing peyote. City's brief at 33-41. 
The commission carefully considered the testimony of the witnesses who testified 
before the commission, the internal affairs investigation, and all evidence presented, and 
determined that Begay's intent in keeping the 87 peyote buttons in soil was to preserve 
the peyote in live form (R. 23-26,30-31; R. 154 at 11-12). 
In reviewing the commission's factual findings, this Court bears in mind that the 
legislature has designated the commission as the fact finder in this context, and has 
required the commission to find the relevant facts and apply the law to those facts. See, 
5Rule 6-4-6(4) of the Salt Lake Civil Service Commission's rules requires the 
department to carry the burden of proof in disciplinary appeals. See 
http://slcilp.slcgov.com/Civil^ 
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e.g.. Qgden City Corp. v. Harmon, 2005 UT App 274, % 9, 2005 WL 1404604. 
Accordingly, the Court reverses the commission only if its decision was beyond the limits 
of reasonableness and rationality. Id. When credibility issues are involved, this Court 
does not re-weigh the evidence, but defers to the commission. E.g., Huemiller v. Qgden 
City Civil Service Comm'n. 2004 UT App 375, flf 2 and 3 and n.l, 101 P.3d 394. 
The commission recognized that the evidence was unclear and conflicting 
regarding Begay's intent in putting the peyote buttons she had received in soil, but 
specifically found after considering the conflicting evidence that Begay's primary purpose 
in putting the buttons in soil was to preserve them, in accordance with standard NAC 
practices (R. 23-24,30). 
In challenging these findings, the city makes no argument that the commission's 
resolution of the evidence was beyond the limits of reasonableness or rationality, or that 
there is any legal basis for this Court to re-weigh the evidence and re-assess the credibility 
of the testimony. But see, e.g., Harmon and Huemiller, supra. Instead, the city argues 
that the commission abused its discretion in failing to recognize that Begay was 
manufacturing and producing peyote. City's brief at 42. In this argument, the city is 
relying on the definitions of manufacturing and producing a controlled substance under 
the definitions of 21 U.S.C. 802. E.g. city's brief at 42. As noted supra, those definitions 
specifically apply only to the control and enforcement subchapter of title 21, see 21 
U.S.C. § 802 ("As used in this subchapter ..."), and have no application to Title 42, the 
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location of the AIRFA. 
Because the city has neither attempted to meet nor met its burden to show that the 
commission's finding was beyond the limits of reasonableness or rationality, and has 
done nothing to justify this Court's deviating from the standard proscriptions against re-
weighing of the evidence and reassessing credibility issues on appeal, and is relying on 
inapplicable law in challenging the finding, the Court should affirm the finding that 
Begay was preserving the peyote in the soil, a protected act under AIRFA. See, Harmon; 
Huemiller, supra. 
II. 
THE COMMISSION CORRECTLY FOUND 
THAT THE TERMINATION OF BEGAY 
WAS DISPROPORTIONATE. 
The commission properly concluded that the police department failed to carry its 
burden of proving that Begay had violated the law, and that Begay's termination was 
disproportionate to any impropriety that may have occurred. 
In reviewing a disciplinary decision, the commission normally must defer to the 
chief of police to a certain extent, as the chief would normally be in the best position to 
know whether punishment is warranted. See Ogden City Corp. v. Harmon, 2005 UT App 
274, TI 17, 2005 WL 1404604. If the discipline the chief imposes is clearly 
disproportionate or beyond the limits of reasonableness, the commission may reverse. 
See id. 
In this instance, however, the chiefs decision to fire Lieutenant Begay turned on a 
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legal conclusion - that her conduct amounted to a felony (R. 153 at 89, 105). He 
conceded that he would "probably have to reinstate her" if she had not committed a crime 
(R. 153 at 95). 
Given that the chief was not in a superior position to the commission to assess 
whether Begay's conduct amounted to a crime, the deference that would normally extend 
to his firing decision was and is not required. 
In assessing a punishment for proportionality, 
an exemplary service record and tenuous evidence of misconduct may tip 
the balance against termination. On the other hand, dishonesty, id., or a 
series of violations accompanied by apparently ineffective progressive 
discipline may support termination. Other courts have given weight to 
considerations of (a) whether the violation is directly related to the 
employee's official duties and significantly impedes his or her ability to 
carry out those duties; (b) whether the offense was of a type that adversely 
affects the public confidence in the department; (c) whether the offense 
undermines the morale and effectiveness of the department; or (d) whether 
the offense was committed willfully or knowingly, rather than negligently 
or inadvertently. 
Harmon, at f^ 18 (citations omitted). 
In Harmon, this Court reversed a civil service commission's decision reversing a 
fire department chiefs decision to terminate a fire department captain. In the course of 
reaching its conclusion, the commission found that the captain had organized an event 
wherein firefighters appeared in public with topless women, had missed three mandatory 
training meetings, had provided to a superior officer a bottle of urine in lieu of weed 
killer, and had urinated into a water pit being used by another fire crew. Id. at f^ 3. There 
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was also evidence at the hearing, which two of the three commissioners declined to 
consider, that the captain had urinated into a shower stall occupied by another fire fighter, 
and had engaged in sexual banter with, and had presented a greased zucchini, to a 
probationary female firefighter. Id. at ^ 4-5. The captain had also permitted subordinate 
male fire fighters to routinely "hump" one another in horseplay. Id. at f^ 6. 
This Court reversed the commission, holding that the commission should have 
considered all of the captain's alleged misbehavior, and also should have determined 
whether the captain was dishonest during the official investigation into his misbehavior. 
Id. at ^ 12-15. The Court remanded to the commission for consideration of whether the 
punishment was proportionate under the factors listed above. Id. at ^ [16-18. 
In contrast to the facts in Harmon, as the discussion in point I demonstrates, there 
is no clear proof that Lieutenant Begay committed any offense, because her conduct was 
all geared toward her legitimate religious use, possession and transportation of peyote. 
See 42 U.S.C. § 1996a. If she did commit an offense, it was certainly not a willful or 
knowing one. 
Lieutenant Begay has served our community as a Salt Lake City Police Officer for 
sixteen and a half years, and served in the military police before that - police work was 
her life (R. 153 at 221-22). She received numerous commendations for her excellent 
service (R. 153 at 10-13, 221-23; Deposition Exhibit A, pages 2-28). Her job 
performance evaluations from 1986 through 2001 were excellent (Deposition Exhibit A, 
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pages 30-46). 
The chief of police recognized that she was an outstanding police officer with no 
history of discipline, who had received excellent evaluations and many commendations, 
and who had earned her Master of Social Work degree while serving as a police officer 
(R. 153 at 90-91). 
While she was in school working on her Master's, she maintained a grade point 
average close to 4.0, and taught courses in conferences on alcohol and drug dependency, 
on the role of peyote and Native American Church involvement in healing alcoholism (R. 
153 at 118). As part of her social work education, Begay performed psychiatric and 
trauma evaluations at the University of Utah Emergency Department (R. 153 at 120). She 
was the head of the CIT, or Crimes Intervention Team, designed to deal with mentally ill 
and violent offenders, and developed a statewide program on how to handle mentally ill 
people (R. 153 at 223). She was also a highly effective narcotics officer (R. 153 at 226). 
Begay is an enrolled member of the Cherokee Chippewa Tribe, and a member of 
the Native American Church (R. 153 at 223). Peyote is a holy sacrament which is used in 
Native American Church ceremonies, and its religious use by Native Americans is 
protected by federal law, see 42 U.S.C. § 1996a (R. 153 at 226). Begay's use of peyote 
never interfered with her work, and she discussed it with her fellow officers and 
supervisors (R. 153 at 226-228). 
Numerous fellow officers and others who had worked with her in the mental health 
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field attested to her integrity and high ethical standards, to her exemplary commitment to 
her work, and to the fact that her religious involvement with peyote was not detrimental 
to her or her professional performance in any way (R. 153 at 121-122, 185-87, 188-90, 
200,201-03). 
On these facts, the commission did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the 
chiefs termination of Begay was disproportionate. The proof of any violation by Begay 
was tenuous, and did not establish a willful violation. Her service record is excellent and 
her commitment to our police force has been above reproach for sixteen-and-a-half years. 
She has no record of dishonesty, serial violations, or unresponsiveness to discipline. Her 
alleged violation has not effected or impeded her performance as a police officer, and has 
not demoralized or scandalized the department. 
On these facts, the commission did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the 
chiefs termination of Begay was disproportionate. Cf. Harmon, supra. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm the commission's decision ordering the reinstatement of 
Lieutenant Begay as a Salt Lake City Police Department lieutenant in good standing. 
Respectfully submitted this July & , 2005. 
Edward K. Brass 
Counsel for Lieutenant Begay 
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ADDENDUM 
1 
Controlling Statutes and Regulation 
2 
Controlling Statutes and Regulation 
2 
21 CFR 1307.31 
The listing of peyote as a controlled substance in Schedule I does not apply to the 
nondrug use of peyote in bona fide religious ceremonies of the Native American Church, 
and members of the Native American Church so using peyote are exempt from 
registration. Any person who manufactures peyote for or distributes peyote to the Native 
American Church, however, is required to obtain registration annually and to comply with 
all other requirements of law. 
21 U.S.C. § 802. Definitions 
As used in this subchapter: 
1. (1) The term "addict" means any individual who habitually uses any narcotic drug 
so as to endanger the public morals, health, safety, or welfare, or who is so far 
addicted to the use of narcotic drugs as to have lost the power of self-control with 
reference to his addiction. 
(2) The term "administer" refers to the direct application of a controlled substance to the 
body of a patient or research subject by~ 
(A) a practitioner (or, in his presence, by his authorized agent), or 
(B) the patient or research subject at the direction and in the presence of the practitioner, 
whether such application be by injection, inhalation, ingestion, or any other means. 
(3) The term "agent" means an authorized person who acts on behalf of or at the direction 
of a manufacturer, distributor, or dispenser; except that such term does not include a 
common or contract carrier, public warehouseman, or employee of the carrier or 
warehouseman, when acting in the usual and lawful course of the carrier's or 
warehouseman's business. 
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(4) The term "Drug Enforcement Administration" means the Drug Enforcement 
Administration in the Department of Justice. 
(5) The term "control" means to add a drug or other substance, or immediate precursor, to 
a schedule under part B of this subchapter, whether by transfer from another schedule or 
otherwise. 
(6) The term "controlled substance" means a drug or other substance, or immediate 
precursor, included in schedule I, II, III, IV, or V of part B of this subchapter. The term 
does not include distilled spirits, wine, malt beverages, or tobacco, as those terms are 
defined or used in subtitle E of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986. 
(7) The term "counterfeit substance" means a controlled substance which, or the container 
or labeling of which, without authorization, bears the trademark, trade name, or other 
identifying mark, imprint, number, or device, or any likeness thereof, of a manufacturer, 
distributor, or dispenser other than the person or persons who in fact manufactured, 
distributed, or dispensed such substance and which thereby falsely purports or is 
represented to be the product of, or to have been distributed by, such other manufacturer, 
distributor, or dispenser. 
(8) The terms "deliver" or "delivery" mean the actual, constructive, or attempted transfer 
of a controlled substance or a listed chemical, whether or not there exists an agency 
relationship. 
(9) The term "depressant or stimulant substance" means— 
(A) a drug which contains any quantity of barbituric acid or any ol the salts ot barbituric 
acid; or 
(B) a drug which contains any quantity of (i) amphetamine or any of its optical isomers; 
(ii) any salt of amphetamine or any salt of an optical isomer of amphetamine; or (iii) any 
substance which the Attorney General, after investigation, has found to be, and by 
regulation designated as, habit forming because of its stimulant effect on the central 
nervous system; or 
(C) lysergic acid diethylamide; or 
(D) any drug which contains any quantity of a substance which the Attorney General, 
after investigation, has found to have, and by regulation designated as having, a potential 
for abuse because of its depressant or stimulant effect on the central nervous system or its 
hallucinogenic effect. 
(10) The term "dispense" means to deliver a controlled substance to an ultimate user or 
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research subject by, or pursuant to the lawful order of, a practitioner, including the 
prescribing and administering of a controlled substance and the packaging, labeling or 
compounding necessary to prepare the substance for such delivery. The term "dispenser" 
means a practitioner who so delivers a controlled substance to an ultimate user or research 
subject. 
(11) The term "distribute" means to deliver (other than by administering or dispensing) a 
controlled substance or a listed chemical. The term "distributor" means a person who so 
delivers a controlled substance or a listed chemical. 
(12) The term "drug" has the meaning given that term by section 32 UgXl) of this title. 
(13) The term "felony" means any Federal or State offense classified by applicable 
Federal or State law as a felony. 
(14) The term "isomer" means the optical isomer, except as used in schedule 1(c) and 
schedule 11(a)(4). As used in schedule 1(c), the term "isomer" means any optical, 
positional, or geometric isomer. As used in schedule 11(a)(4), the term "isomer" means 
any optical or geometric isomer. 
(15) The term "manufacture" means the production, preparation, propagation, 
compounding, or processing of a drug or other substance, either directly or indirectly or 
by extraction from substances of natural origin, or independently by means of chemical 
synthesis or by a combination of extraction and chemical synthesis, and includes any 
packaging or repackaging of such substance or labeling or relabeling of its container; 
except that such term does not include the preparation, compounding, packaging, or 
labeling of a drug or other substance in conformity with applicable State or local law by a 
practitioner as an incident to his administration or dispensing of such drug or substance in 
the course of his professional practice. The term "manufacturer" means a person who 
manufactures a drug or other substance. 
(16) The term "marihuana" means all parts of the plant Cannabis sativa L., whether 
growing or not; the seeds thereof; the resin extracted from any part of such plant; and 
every compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of such plant, its 
seeds or resin. Such term does not include the mature stalks of such plant, fiber produced 
from such stalks, oil or cake made from the seeds of such plant, any other compound, 
manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of such mature stalks (except the 
resin extracted therefrom), fiber, oil, or cake, or the sterilized seed of such plant which is 
incapable of germination. 
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(17) The term "narcotic drug" means any of the following whether produced directly or 
indirectly by extraction from substances of vegetable origin, or independently by means 
of chemical synthesis, or by a combination of extraction and chemical synthesis: 
(A) Opium, opiates, derivatives of opium and opiates, including their isomers, esters, 
ethers, salts, and salts of isomers, esters, and ethers, whenever the existence of such 
isomers, esters, ethers, and salts is possible within the specific chemical designation. Such 
term does not include the isoquinoline alkaloids of opium. 
(B) Poppy straw and concentrate of poppy straw. 
(C) Coca leaves, except coca leaves and extracts of coca leaves from which cocaine, 
ecgonine, and derivatives of ecgonine or their salts have been removed. 
(D) Cocaine, its salts, optical and geometric isomers, and salts of isomers. 
(E) Ecgonine, its derivatives, their salts, isomers, and salts of isomers. 
(F) Any compound, mixture, or preparation which contains any quantity of any of the 
substances referred to in subparagraphs (A) through (E). 
(18) The term "opiate" means any drug or other substance having an addiction-forming or 
addiction-sustaining liability similar to morphine or being capable of conversion into a 
drug having such addiction-forming or addiction-sustaining liability. 
(19) The term "opium poppy" means the plant of the species Papaver somniferum L., 
except the seed thereof. 
(20) The term "poppy straw" means all parts, except the seeds, of the opium poppy, after 
mowing. 
(21) The term "practitioner" means a physician, dentist, veterinarian, scientific 
investigator, pharmacy, hospital, or other person licensed, registered, or otherwise 
permitted, by the United States or the jurisdiction in which he practices or does research, 
to distribute, dispense, conduct research with respect to, administer, or use in teaching or 
chemical analysis, a controlled substance in the course of professional practice or 
research. 
(22) The term "production" includes the manufacture, planting, cultivation, growing, or 
harvesting of a controlled substance. 
(23) The term "immediate precursor" means a substance--
(A) which the Attorney General has found to be and by regulation designated as being the 
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principal compound used, or produced primarily for use, in the manufacture of a 
controlled substance; 
(B) which is an immediate chemical intermediary used or likely to be used in the 
manufacture of such controlled substance; and 
(C) the control of which is necessary to prevent, curtail, or limit the manufacture of such 
controlled substance. 
(24) The term "Secretary", unless the context otherwise indicates, means the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services. 
(25) The term "serious bodily injury" means bodily injury which involves— 
(A) a substantial risk of death; 
(B) protracted and obvious disfigurement; or 
(C) protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental 
faculty. 
(26) The term "State" means a State of the United States, the District of Columbia, and 
any commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States. 
(27) The term "ultimate user" means a person who has lawfully obtained, and who 
possesses, a controlled substance for his own use or for the use of a member of his 
household or for an animal owned by him or by a member of his household. 
(28) The term "United States", when used in a geographic sense, means all places and 
waters, continental or insular, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. 
(29) The term "maintenance treatment" means the dispensing, for a period in excess of 
twenty-one days, of a narcotic drug in the treatment of an individual for dependence upon 
heroin or other morphine-like drugs. 
(30) The term "detoxification treatment" means the dispensing, for a period not in excess 
of one hundred and eighty days, of a narcotic drug in decreasing doses to an individual in 
order to alleviate adverse physiological or psychological effects incident to withdrawal 
from the continuous or sustained use of a narcotic drug and as a method of bringing the 
individual to a narcotic drug-free state within such period. 
(31) The term "Convention on Psychotropic Substances" means the Convention on 
Psychotropic Substances signed at Vienna, Austria, on February 21, 1971; and the term 
"Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs" means the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs 
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signed at New York, New York, on March 30, 1961. 
(32)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (C), the term "controlled substance 
analogue" means a substance-
(i) the chemical structure of which is substantially similar to the chemical structure of a 
controlled substance in schedule I or II; 
(ii) which has a stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous 
system that is substantially similar to or greater than the stimulant, depressant, or 
hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system of a controlled substance in schedule 
I or II; or 
(iii) with respect to a particular person, which such person represents or intends to have a 
stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system that is 
substantially similar to or greater than the stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect 
on the central nervous system of a controlled substance in schedule I or II. 
(B) The designation of gamma butyrolactone or any other chemical as a listed chemical 
pursuant to paragraph (34) or (35) does not preclude a finding pursuant to subparagraph 
(A) of this paragraph that the chemical is a controlled substance analogue. 
(C) Such term does not include-
(i) a controlled substance; 
(ii) any substance for which there is an approved new drug application; 
(iii) with respect to a particular person any substance, if an exemption is in effect for 
investigational use, for that person, under section 355 of this title to the extent conduct 
with respect to such substance is pursuant to such exemption; or 
(iv) any substance to the extent not intended for human consumption before such an 
exemption takes effect with respect to that substance. 
(33) The term "listed chemical" means any list I chemical or any list II chemical. 
(34) The term "list I chemical" means a chemical specified by regulation of the Attorney 
General as a chemical that is used in manufacturing a controlled substance in violation of 
this subchapter and is important to the manufacture of the controlled substances, and such 
term includes (until otherwise specified by regulation of the Attorney General, as 
considered appropriate by the Attorney General or upon petition to the Attorney General 
by any person) the following: 
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(A) Anthranilic acid, its esters, and its salts. 
(B) Benzyl cyanide. 
(C) Ephedrine, its salts, optical isomers, and salts of optical isomers. 
(D) Ergonovine and its salts. 
(E) Ergotamine and its salts. 
(F) N-Acetylanthranilic acid, its esters, and its salts. 
(G) Norpseudoephedrine, its salts, optical isomers, and salts of optical isomers. 
(H) Phenylacetic acid, its esters, and its salts. 
(I) Phenylpropanolamine, its salts, optical isomers, and salts of optical isomers. 
(J) Piperidine and its salts. 
(K) Pseudoephedrine, its salts, optical isomers, and salts of optical isomers. 
(L) 3,4-Methylenedioxyphenyl-2-propanone. 
(M) Methylamine. 
(N) Ethylamine. 
(O) Propionic anhydride. 
(P) Isosafrole. 
(Q) Safrole. 
(R) Piperonal. 
(S) N-Methylephedrine. 
(T) N-methylpseudoephedrine. 
(U) Hydriodic acid. 
(V) Benzaldehyde. 
(W) Nitroethane. 
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(X) Gamma butyrolactone. 
(Y) Any salt, optical isomer, or salt of an optical isomer of the chemicals listed in 
subparagraphs (M) through (U) of this paragraph. 
(35) The term "list II chemical" means a chemical (other than a list I chemical) specified 
by regulation of the Attorney General as a chemical that is used in manufacturing a 
controlled substance in violation of this subchapter, and such term includes (until 
otherwise specified by regulation of the Attorney General, as considered appropriate by 
the Attorney General or upon petition to the Attorney General by any person) the 
following chemicals: 
(A) Acetic anhydride. 
(B) Acetone. 
(C) Benzyl chloride. 
(D) Ethyl ether. 
(E) Repealed. Pub.L. 101-647, Title XXIII, § 2301(b), Nov. 29, 1990, 104 Stat. 4858 
(F) Potassium permanganate. 
(G) 2-Butanone (or Methyl Ethyl Ketone). 
(H) Toluene. 
(I) Iodine. 
(J) Hydrochloric gas. 
(36) The term "regular customer" means, with respect to a regulated person, a customer 
with whom the regulated person has an established business relationship that is reported 
to the Attorney General. 
(37) The term "regular importer" means, with respect to a listed chemical, a person that 
has an established record as an importer of that listed chemical that is reported to the 
Attorney General. 
(38) The term "regulated person" means a person who manufactures, distributes, imports, 
or exports a listed chemical, a tableting machine, or an encapsulating machine or who acts 
as a broker or trader for an international transaction involving a listed chemical, a 
tableting machine, or an encapsulating machine. 
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(39) The term "regulated transaction11 means— 
(A) a distribution, receipt, sale, importation, or exportation of, or an international 
transaction involving shipment of, a listed chemical, or if the Attorney General 
establishes a threshold amount for a specific listed chemical, a threshold amount, 
including a cumulative threshold amount for multiple transactions (as determined by the 
Attorney General, in consultation with the chemical industry and taking into consideration 
the quantities normally used for lawful purposes), of a listed chemical, except that such 
term does not include— 
(i) a domestic lawful distribution in the usual course of business between agents or 
employees of a single regulated person; 
(ii) a delivery of a listed chemical to or by a common or contract carrier for carriage in the 
lawful and usual course of the business of the common or contract carrier, or to or by a 
warehouseman for storage in the lawful and usual course of the business of the 
warehouseman, except that if the carriage or storage is in connection with the distribution, 
importation, or exportation of a listed chemical to a third person, this clause does not 
relieve a distributor, importer, or exporter from compliance with section 830 of this title; 
(iii) any category of transaction or any category of transaction for a specific listed 
chemical or chemicals specified by regulation of the Attorney General as excluded from 
this definition as unnecessary for enforcement of this subchapter or subchapter II of this 
chapter; 
(iv) any transaction in a listed chemical that is contained in a drug that may be marketed 
or distributed lawfully in the United States under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act (21 U.S.C. 301 et seq.) unless-
(I)(aa) the drug contains ephedrine or its salts, optical isomers, or salts of optical isomers, 
pseudoephedrine or its salts, optical isomers, or salts of optical isomers, or 
phenylpropanolamine or its salts, optical isomers, or salts of optical isomers unless 
otherwise provided by regulation of the Attorney General issued pursuant to section 
814(e) of this title, except that any sale of ordinary over-the-counter pseudoephedrine or 
phenylpropanolamine products by retail distributors shall not be a regulated transaction 
(except as provided in section 401(d) of the Comprehensive Methamphetamine Control 
Act of 1996); or 
(bb) the Attorney General has determined under section 814 of this title that the drug or 
group of drugs is being diverted to obtain the listed chemical for use in the illicit 
production of a controlled substance; and 
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(II) the quantity of ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, phenylpropanolamine, or other listed 
chemical contained in the drug included in the transaction or multiple transactions equals 
or exceeds the threshold established for that chemical by the Attorney General, except 
that the threshold for any sale of products containing pseudoephedrine or 
phenylpropanolamine products by retail distributors or by distributors required to submit 
reports by section 830(b)(3) of this title shall be 9 grams of pseudoephedrine or 9 grams 
of phenylpropanolamine in a single transaction and sold in package sizes of not more than 
3 grams of pseudoephedrine base or 3 grams of phenylpropanolamine base; or 
(v) any transaction in a chemical mixture which the Attorney General has by regulation 
designated as exempt from the application of this subchapter and subchapter II of this 
chapter based on a finding that the mixture is formulated in such a way that it cannot be 
easily used in the illicit production of a controlled substance and that the listed chemical 
or chemicals contained in the mixture cannot be readily recovered; and 
(B) a distribution, importation, or exportation of a tableting machine or encapsulating 
machine. 
(40) The term "chemical mixture" means a combination of two or more chemical 
substances, at least one of which is not a list I chemical or a list II chemical, except that 
such term does not include any combination of a list I chemical or a list II chemical with 
another chemical that is present solely as an impurity. 
(41)(A) The term "anabolic steroid" means any drug or hormonal substance, chemically 
and pharmacologically related to testosterone (other than estrogens, progestins, 
corticosteroids, and dehydroepiandrosterone), and includes 
(i) androstanediol--
(I) 3«BETA»,17«BETA»-dihydroxy-5«BETA»- androstane; and 
(II) 3aa,17aa-dihydroxy-5cca- androstane; 
(ii) androstanedione (5oca-androstan-3,17-dione); 
(iii) androstenediol-
(I) 1 -androstenediol ( 3 « B E T A » , 17«BETA>>-dihydroxy-5«BETA»-androst-1 -
ene); 
(II) 1-androstenediol (3aa,17aa-dihydroxy-5aa-androst-l-ene); 
(III) 4-androstenediol (3«BETA»,17«BETA»-dihydroxy-androst-4-ene); and 
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(IV) 5-androstenediol ( 3 « B E T A » , 17«BETA»-dihydroxy-androst-5-ene); 
(iv) androstenedione--
(I) 1-androstenedione ([5oca]-androst-l-en-3,17-dione); 
(II) 4-androstenedione (androst-4-en-3,17-dione); and 
(III) 5-androstenedione (androst-5-en-3,17-dione); 
(v) bolasterone (7aa,17aa- dimethyl-17cca-hydroxyandrost-4-en-3-one); 
(vi) boldenone (17«BETA»-hydroxyandrost-l?49-diene-3-one); 
(vii) calusterone ( 7 « B E T A » , 17«BETA»-dimethyl-17«BETA»-hydroxyandrost-
4- en-3-one); 
(viii) clostebol (4-chloro-17«BETA»-hydroxyandrost-4-en-3-one); 
(ix) dehydrochloromethyltestosterone (4-chloro-17«BETA»-hydroxy-17«BETA»-
methyl-androst-l5 4-dien-3-one); 
(x) A? 1-dihydrotestosterone (a.k.a. ffl-testosteroneff) (17A?-hydroxy-5A?-androst-l-en-
3-one); 
(xi) 4-dihydrotestosterone (17«BETA»-hydroxy-androstan-3-one); 
(xii) drostanolone (17«BETA»-hydroxy-2«BETA»- methyl-5 « B E T A » -
androstan-3- one); 
(xiii) ethylestrenol (17aa-ethyl-17cca-hydroxyestr-4-ene); 
(xiv) fluoxymesterone (9-fluoro-17aa-methyl-llcca, 17aa-dihydroxyandrost-4-en-3- one); 
(xv) formebolone (2-formyl-17aa-methyl-llaa, 17aa-dihydroxyandrost-l,4-dien-3- one); 
(xvi) furazabol (17oca-methyl-17oca-hydroxyandrostano[2,3-c]-furazan); 
(xvii) 13«BETA»-ethyl-17«BETA»-hydroxygon-4-en-3-one; 
(xviii) 4-hydroxytestosterone (4,17«BETA»-dihydroxy-androst-4-en-3-one); 
(xix) 4-hydroxy-19-nortestosterone (4517«BETA»-dihydroxy-estr-4-en-3-one); 
(xx) mestanolone (17aa-methyl- 17aa-hydroxy-5aa-androstan-3-one); 
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(xxi) mesterolone (laa-methyl-17aa-hydroxy-[5oca] -androstan-3-one); 
(xxii) methandienone (17aa-methyl-17aa-hydroxyandrost-1,4-dien-3-one); 
(xxiii) methandriol (17cca-methyl- 3oca,17aa-dihydroxyandrost-5-ene); 
(xxiv) methenolone (1 -methyl-17«BETA»-hydroxy-5«BETA»-androst-1 -en-3-
one); 
(xxv) 17aa-methyl-3oca, 17cca-dihydroxy-5aa-androstane; 
(xxvi) 17cca-methyl-3cca5 17aa-dihydroxy-5aa-androstane; 
(xxvii) 17oca-methyl-3oca, 17cca-dihydroxyandrost-4-ene. 
(xxviii) 17aa-methyl-4-hydroxynandrolone (17aa-methyl-4-hydroxy-17cca-hydroxyestr-4-
en-3-one); 
(xxix) methyldienolone (17oca-methyl-17oca-hydroxyestra-4,9( 10)-dien-3-one); 
(xxx) methyltrienolone (17aa-methyl-17cca-hydroxyestra-4,9-l l-trien-3-one); 
(xxxi) methyltestosterone (17aa-methyl-17oca-hydroxyandrost-4-en-3-one); 
(xxxii) mibolerone (7cca, 17aa-dimethyl-17aa-hydroxyestr-4-en-3-one); 
(xxxiii) 17oca-methyl-aa 1-dihydrotestosterone (17aa-hydroxy-17aa-methyl-5oca-androst-
l-en-3-one) (a.k.a. "17-oca-methyl-l-testosterone"); 
(xxxiv) nandrolone (17«BETA»-hydroxyestr-4-en-3-one); 
(xxxv) norandrostenediol— 
(I) 19-nor-4-androstenediol ( 3 « B E T A » , 17<<BETA>>-dihydroxyestr-4-ene); 
(II) 19-nor-4-androstenediol (3 oca, 17aa-dihydroxyestr-4-ene); 
(III) 19-nor-5-androstenediol ( 3 « B E T A » , 17«BETA»-dihydroxyestr-5-ene); and 
(IV) 19-nor-5-androstenediol (3oca, 17aa-dihydroxyestr-5-ene); 
(xxxvi) norandrostenedione-
(I) 19-nor-4-androstenedione (estr-4-en-3,17-dione); and 
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(II) 19-nor-5-androstenedione (estr-5-en-3,17-dione; 
(xxxvii) norbolethone ( 1 3 « B E T A » , 17«BETA»-diethyl-17«BETA»-
hydroxygon-4- en-3-one); 
(xxxviii) norclostebol (4-chloro 17«BETA»-hydroxyestr-4-en-3-one); 
(xxxix) norethandrolone (17 oca-ethyl-17oca-hydroxyestr-4-en-3-one); 
(xl) normethandrolone (17aa-methyl-17aa-hydroxyestr-4-en-3-one); 
(xli) oxandrolone (17aa-methyl-17aa-hydroxy-2-oxa-[5aa]- androstan-3-one); 
(xlii) oxymesterone (17oca-methyl-4,17aa-dihydroxyandrost-4-en-3-one); 
(xliii) oxymetholone (17aa-methyl-2-hydroxymethylene-17aa-hydroxy- [5aa]-androstan-
3-one); 
(xliv) stanozolol (17aa-methyl- 17aa-hydroxy-[5aa]-androst-2-eno[3,2-c]-pyrazole); 
(xlv) stenbolone (17«BETA»-hydroxy-2-methyl-[5«BETA»] -androst-l-en-3-one); 
(xlvi) testolactone (13-hydroxy-3-oxo-13,17-secoandrosta-l,4-dien-17-oic acid lactone); 
(xlvii) testosterone (17«BETA»-hydroxyandrost-4-en-3-one); 
(xlviii) tetrahydrogestrinone (13 « B E T A » , 17«BETA»-diethyl-17«BETA»-
hydroxygon-4,9, ll-trien-3-one); 
(xlix) trenbolone (17«BETA»-hydroxyestr-459?ll-trien-3-one); and 
(xlx) any salt, ester, or ether of a drug or substance described in this paragraph. 
The substances excluded under this subparagraph may at any time be scheduled by the 
Attorney General in accordance with the authority and requirements of subsections (a) 
through (c) of section 811 of this title. 
(B)(i) Except as provided in clause (ii), such term does not include an anabolic steroid 
which is expressly intended for administration through implants to cattle or other 
nonhuman species and which has been approved by the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services for such administration. 
(ii) If any person prescribes, dispenses, or distributes such steroid for human use, such 
person shall be considered to have prescribed, dispensed, or distributed an anabolic 
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steroid within the meaning of subparagraph (A). 
(42) The term "international transaction" means a transaction involving the shipment of a 
listed chemical across an international border (other than a United States border) in which 
a broker or trader located in the United States participates. 
(43) The terms "broker" and "trader" mean a person that assists in arranging an 
international transaction in a listed chemical by— 
(A) negotiating contracts; 
(B) serving as an agent or intermediary; or 
(C) bringing together a buyer and seller, a buyer and transporter, or a seller and 
transporter. 
(44) The term "felony drug offense" means an offense that is punishable by imprisonment 
for more than one year under any law of the United States or of a State or foreign country 
that prohibits or restricts conduct relating to narcotic drugs, marihuana, anabolic steroids, 
or depressant or stimulant substances. 
(45) The term "ordinary over-the-counter pseudoephedrine or phenylpropanolamine 
product" means any product containing pseudoephedrine or phenylpropanolamine that is— 
(A) regulated pursuant to this subchapter; and 
(B)(i) except for liquids, sold in package sizes of not more than 3.0 grams of 
pseudoephedrine base or 3.0 grams of phenylpropanolamine base, and that is packaged in 
blister packs, each blister containing not more than two dosage units, or where the use of 
blister packs is technically infeasible, that is packaged in unit dose packets or pouches; 
and 
(ii) for liquids, sold in package sizes of not more than 3.0 grams of pseudoephedrine base 
or 3.0 grams of phenylpropanolamine base. 
(46)(A) The term "retail distributor" means a grocery store, general merchandise store, 
drug store, or other entity or person whose activities as a distributor relating to 
pseudoephedrine or phenylpropanolamine products are limited almost exclusively to sales 
for personal use, both in number of sales and volume of sales, either directly to walk-in 
customers or in face-to-face transactions by direct sales. 
(B) For purposes of this paragraph, sale for personal use means the sale of below-
threshold quantities in a single transaction to an individual for legitimate medical use. 
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(C) For purposes of this paragraph, entities are defined by reference to the Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) code, as follows: 
(i) A grocery store is an entity within SIC code 5411. 
(ii) A general merchandise store is an entity within SIC codes 5300 through 5399 and 
5499. 
(iii) A drug store is an entity within SIC code 5912. 
42 U.S.C. § 1996a 
(a) Congressional findings and declarations 
The Congress finds and declares that— 
(1) for many Indian people, the traditional ceremonial use of the peyote cactus as a 
religious sacrament has for centuries been integral to a way of life, and significant in 
perpetuating Indian tribes and cultures; 
(2) since 1965, this ceremonial use of peyote by Indians has been protected by Federal 
regulation; 
(3) while at least 28 States have enacted laws which are similar to, or are in conformance 
with, the Federal regulation which protects the ceremonial use of peyote by Indian 
religious practitioners, 22 States have not done so, and this lack of uniformity has created 
hardship for Indian people who participate in such religious ceremonies; 
(4) the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Employment Division v. Smith, 
494 U.S. 872(1990\ held that the First Amendment does not protect Indian practitioners 
who use peyote in Indian religious ceremonies, and also raised uncertainty whether this 
religious practice would be protected under the compelling State interest standard; and 
(5) the lack of adequate and clear legal protection for the religious use of peyote by 
Indians may serve to stigmatize and marginalize Indian tribes and cultures, and increase 
the risk that they will be exposed to discriminatory treatment. 
(b) Use, possession, or transportation of peyote 
17 
(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the use, possession, or transportation of 
peyote by an Indian for bona fide traditional ceremonial purposes in connection with the 
practice of a traditional Indian religion is lawful, and shall not be prohibited by the United 
States or any State. No Indian shall be penalized or discriminated against on the basis of 
such use, possession or transportation, including, but not limited to, denial of otherwise 
applicable benefits under public assistance programs. 
(2) This section does not prohibit such reasonable regulation and registration by the Drug 
Enforcement Administration of those persons who cultivate, harvest, or distribute peyote 
as may be consistent with the purposes of this section and section 1996 of this title. 
(3) This section does not prohibit application of the provisions of section 481.111(a) of 
Vernonfs Texas Health and Safety Code Annotated, in effect on October 6, 1994, insofar 
as those provisions pertain to the cultivation, harvest, and distribution of peyote. 
(4) Nothing in this section shall prohibit any Federal department or agency, in carrying 
out its statutory responsibilities and functions, from promulgating regulations establishing 
reasonable limitations on the use or ingestion of peyote prior to or during the performance 
of duties by sworn law enforcement officers or personnel directly involved in public 
transportation or any other safety-sensitive positions where the performance of such 
duties may be adversely affected by such use or ingestion. Such regulations shall be 
adopted only after consultation with representatives of traditional Indian religions for 
which the sacramental use of peyote is integral to their practice. Any regulation 
promulgated pursuant to this section shall be subject to the balancing test set forth in 
section 3 of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (Public Law 103-141: 42 U.S.C. 
2000bb-n. 
(5) This section shall not be construed as requiring prison authorities to permit, nor shall 
it be construed to prohibit prison authorities from permitting, access to peyote by Indians 
while incarcerated within Federal or State prison facilities. 
(6) Subject to the provisions of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (Public Law 103-
141: 42 U.S.C. 2000bb-n f42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb et seq.], this section shall not be 
construed to prohibit States from enacting or enforcing reasonable traffic safety laws or regulations. 
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(7) Subject to the provisions of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (Public Law 103-
141; 42 U.S.C. 2000bb-l), this section does not prohibit the Secretary of Defense from 
promulgating regulations establishing reasonable limitations on the use, possession, 
transportation, or distribution of peyote to promote military readiness, safety, or 
compliance with international law or laws of other countries. Such regulations shall be 
adopted only after consultation with representatives of traditional Indian religions for 
which the sacramental use of peyote is integral to their practice. 
(c) Definitions 
For purposes of this section— 
(1) the term "Indian" means a member of an Indian tribe; 
(2) the term "Indian tribe" means any tribe, band, nation, pueblo, or other organized group 
or community of Indians, including any Alaska Native village (as defined in, or 
established pursuant to, the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (43 U.S.C. 1601 et 
seq.)), which is recognized as eligible for the special programs and services provided by 
the United States to Indians because of their status as Indians; 
(3) the term "Indian religion" means any religion— 
(A) which is practiced by Indians, and 
(B) the origin and interpretation of which is from within a traditional Indian culture or 
community; and 
(4) the term "State" means any State of the United States, and any political subdivision thereof. 
(d) Protection of rights of Indians and Indian tribes 
Nothing in this section shall be construed as abrogating, diminishing, or otherwise 
affecting-
(1) the inherent rights of any Indian tribe; 
(2) the rights, express or implicit, of any Indian tribe which exist under treaties, Executive 
orders, and laws of the United States; 
(3) the inherent right of Indians to practice their religions; and 
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(4) the right of Indians to practice their religions under any Federal or State law. 
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